OF FRUIT FLIES AND MEN: RETHINKING IMMUTABILITY IN
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS - WITH A VIEW TOWARD A
CONSTITUTIONAL MORAL IMPERATIVE
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The biggestproblem in the world today is
that we draw the circle of ourfamily too small.
- Mother Teresa
INTRODUCTION: ARGUING WHAT?

In this essay, I address claims of equal protection for gay
rights, specifically arguing that the relatively recent focus on trait
immutability in equal protection jurisprudence is improperly
restrictive of the Constitution's moral vision. As an alternative, I
argue that a moral-centered equal protection analysis should take
precedence.
I reason that trait immutability is completely
irrelevant to an essentialist equal protection norm, which ought
properly to prohibit the marginalization of a citizen or group of
citizens when that marginalization is based only on the merely
descriptive moral disapproval of an identity trait - immutable or
otherwise - by the larger society. Consequently, I shift equal
protection analysis to focus on state action, omission, and
complicity in the perpetration and perpetuation of irrational classbased prejudice.
With regard to gays, this is the irrational
prejudice of homophobia.
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The first part of the essay aims to extract the immutability
fallacy and arrive at a purer equal protection formula. Part Two
will apply my derived formula to gay Americans. Part Three
supposes the effect of Lawrence v. Texas on the future of equal
protection for gays and lesbians and argues that, while not
explicitly, the Court's opinion has as many powerful implications
for equal protection jurisprudence as it does for substantive due
process.
I.
A. Gays and the Problem of Immutability
The Constitution's equal protection norm informs us that
all citizens must be treated equally under the law unless there is a
justifiable reason, beyond mere collective prejudice, for imposing
legal burdens. With that standard in mind, gays remain one of the
most inequitably treated groups in the twenty-first century United
States, leading me to observe elsewhere that the problem of the
Recently, I
twenty-first century will be the "sexuality line. ''
discovered a 1973 article, "Is Gay Suspect?" by two nonacademicians, Ellen Chaitin and V. Roy Lefcourt. 2 Reading that
article, penned thirteen years before the now-infamous Bowers v.
Hardwick,3 thirty years before Lawrence v. Texas 4 and Goodridge
v. Dep't of Pub. Health,5 and thirty-two years prior to the moment
at which I began this essay, I was reminded just how little has
changed for gay Americans in terms of legal equality. As a matter
of culture, gays appear on television programs, in the movies, in
music videos, and even in cartoon shows, 6 but gays, except in
1SHANNON GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS: THE GAY PERSON IN AMERICA TODAY
ix (forthcoming 2006) (referring to W. E. B. DuBois' observation that "the
problem of the 20th century will be the color line.").
2 8 LINCOLN LAW REV. 24 (1973).
' 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
' 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
6 See Shannon Gilreath, Outing Sponge Bob: The Mis-Education of America's
Gay
Youth,
QUEER
DAY,
(Feb.
21,
2005),
http://www.queerday.com/2005/feb/2 1/outingspongebob the miseducation of
_americasgayyouth.html
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Massachusetts, still cannot marry, have no federally mandated
protection from discrimination in employment or housing,7 and
may lose custody of their children upon divorcing a heterosexual9
spouse 8 or even upon the dissolution of a same-sex relationship.
Most recently, gays are blamed for the disintegration of the
American family and are the subject of state and federal
constitutional amendment efforts to curtail the possibility of gay
marriage. 10 Many of the same realities were reported by Chaitin
and Lefcourt in 1973.11
Gays have suffered persecution and discrimination
throughout history. In response to the 1986 decision by the United
7 The U.S. Supreme Court protected gay and straight against same-sex sexual

harassment in Oncale, but the nuanced opinion was careful to construe Title VII
as protecting discrimination based on sex - not sexual orientation - which is
underscored in Justice Thomas' concurrence.
See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Svcs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I concur
because the Court stresses that in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff
must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's statutory requirement that there be
discrimination 'because of... sex."')
8 See, e.g., Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998).
9 In states where second parent adoption is unavailable, the non-biological/nonadoptive parent often has no legal rights to children of the same-sex relationship
once the relationship is terminated. See SEAN CAHILL ET AL., NAT'L GAY AND
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, FAMILY POLICY: ISSUES AFFECTING GAY, LESBIAN,

BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILIES

77-78 & n.241 (2003), available at

http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/familypolicy/familypolicyfullversion.pdf.
10 In addition to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and numerous
state DOMAs, thirty-five states have now passed constitutional amendments to
prohibit same-sex marriage, and Republicans have raised a proposed federal
amendment in two sessions of Congress.
See Shannon Gilreath, The
Constitutional Status of Gay Marriage, in MICHAEL K. CURTIS ET AL., 1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INCONTEXT 922, 922 (2d ed. 2006) ("Between 1995 and
2001 ....
34 states enacted laws expressly providing that marriage was limited
to one man and one woman .... )
11This is in no way meant to discount the momentousness of advances like
Lawrence, Goodridge, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), the Connecticut
civil
union
law
(P.A.
05-10
(2005),
available
at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/ACT/Pa/pdf/2005PA-00010-ROOSB-00963-PA.pdf)
and other partnership initiatives. I acknowledge how far gays have come in the
quest for equal rights and dignity, but I must also, realistically, acknowledge
how far gays have yet to go.
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States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, the case that upheld
the criminalization of consensual gay sex acts, Richard Posner
made the following comment in his book Sex andReason:
[S]tatutes which criminalize homosexual behavior express an
irrationalfear and loathing of a group that has been subjected to

discrimination, much like that directed against the Jews, with
whom indeed homosexuals-who, like Jews, are despised more
for who they are than for what they do-were frequently
bracketed in medieval persecutions. The statutes thus have a
quality of invidiousness missing from statutes prohibiting
abortion or contraception. The position of the homosexual is
difficult at best, even in a tolerant society, which our society is
not quite; and it is made worse, though probably not much
worse, by statutes that condemn the homosexual's characteristic
methods of sexual expression as vile crimes . . . There is a

gratuitousness, an egregiousness, a cruelty, and a meanness
about [such laws] .... 12

Judge Posner recognized what Chaitin and Lefcourt
recognized before him: "[In] the reality of American society,
homosexuals are a minority group with the accompanying
characteristics of all harassed and oppressed [minorities], and they
are in need of special protection'1 3by our legal system to combat
these institutionalized injustices."
One logical vehicle for this protection is the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 Gays and the
discrimination they face would seem to fall squarely within the
The Equal Protection
Fourteenth Amendment's protections.
Clause should be understood "as an attempt to protect
disadvantaged groups from [irrational] discriminatory practices,

12

RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON

346 (1992) (emphasis added).

Chaitin & Lefcourt, supra note 2, at 35.
14 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
13

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Court has
held that the Fifth Amendment equal protection clause is comparable to the
Fourteenth Amendment clause. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
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however deeply engrained and longstanding." '1 5 The Clause "looks
forward, serving to invalidate practices that were widespread at the
time of its ratification and that were expected to endure." 16 When
attempting to make their cases for equal treatment under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, gays and their
advocates have seized on the most obvious biological marker of
the Supreme Court's paradigm suspect class - race. Race, they
observe, is immutable, and immutability has, after all, found its
way into textbooks and court decisions concerning equal protection
analysis. But it is precisely this immutability linchpin, once
introduced by gay advocates and ultimately pulled by the court,
which causes equal protection claims for gay Americans to come
unhinged. 17
Various legal formulae have evolved in an effort to
demystify suspect class review. Primarily, they take the course of
the formula laid out in Watkins v. United States.18 The Watkins
panel majority held that "suspect classes" for purposes of equal
protection analysis are (1) groups that have "suffered a history of
purposeful discrimination"; (2) that such discrimination "embodies
a gross unfairness that is sufficiently inconsistent with the ideals of
equal protection to term it invidious"; (3) and that "the group
burdened by official discrimination lacks the political power
necessary to obtain redress from the political branches of
government." 19 No court seems to dispute that gays have been the
Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161, 1163 (1998).
16 id.
15

17

Lower courts have held that gays and lesbians meet the criteria of a suspect

class for Equal Protection purposes, yet they have all been reversed on appeal.
See, e.g., Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
860 F. Supp. 417, 436 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261, 267-68 (6th Cir.
1995), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1996); Able v. United
States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628, 632 (2d

Cir. 1998).
IS847 F.2d 1329, 1345-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), diff results reached on
reh'g, 875 F.2d 699, 724-28 (Canby, J., concurring) (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc),

cert. denied,498 U.S. 957 (1990).
19 Modem Equal Protection analysis was born with Carolene Products and its
famous footnote four. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006

6

JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 9

subject of historical persecution; indeed, Bowers itself particularly Chief Justice Burger's vitriolic concurrence - settled
that point. 2° But most courts denying gays suspect class status and
strict scrutiny have held that gays do not lack political power in a
way that renders them "discrete and insular." 21 This was Justice
4 (1938). In an opinion in which the Court basically surrendered in its war on
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal policies, the Court used Footnote 4 to restate its
guardianship of individual liberties and to preserve its power of review over
such matters in the future. Because the Court specifically marked the rights of
"discrete and insular" minorities for an especially searching review, the debate
has arisen as to what constitutes "discrete and insular." The "immutability"
argument is one attempt at an answer. The full text of Footnote 4 is as follows:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restrict
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
20

(internal citations omitted)
Burger claimed that prohibitions against homosexual conduct had "ancient

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
roots."
concurring) (quoting majority opinion at 192). That question is certainly
debatable, with many historians arguing that widespread repression of gays is a
phenomenon of the past fifty years (see historians brief in Lawrence), but
Burger's perception of "ancient" animus says something about the insidiousness
of contemporary prejudice against lesbians and gays.
21 The whole idea of political powerlessness is more than a little difficult to
square with a Supreme Court jurisprudence that allows white male litigants to
prevail under a suspect class rationale. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) ("[D]iscreteness and insularity [do not]
constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that a particular classification is
invidious.")
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/3
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Scalia's argument in his dissent from Romer v. Evans.22 If this
argument ever possessed any rationality, the argument is baseless
in today's political climate. Despite massive and often wellfunded campaigns to defeat state constitutional amendments aimed
at prohibiting gay marriage, such measures have passed in every
jurisdiction in which they have made it onto the ballot - and by
wide margins.23 The simple mathematics involved in voting along
group lines demonstrates the political impotence of gays as a class.
At the heart of the immutability controversy is the claim
that sexual orientation is not a discreet factor by which gays may
be identified as a group. This claim is incorporated by Bruce
Ackerman, for example, as follows:
As a member of an anonymous group, each homosexual can seek
to minimize the personal harm due to prejudice by keeping his or
her sexual preference a tightly held secret. Although this is
hardly a fully satisfactory response, secrecy does enable
homosexuals to "exit" from prejudice in a way that blacks
cannot.24

Thus, the argument proceeds that gays are not definable in
the way necessary to attain suspect class status. Professor
Ackerman ultimately concludes that groups like gays and lesbians
may be even less politically powerful than usually obviously
insular and discreet groups, i.e., African Americans, and that equal
protection should be most concerned with those groups where the
members are anonymous and diffuse and where detachment from
the group is easier for members thereof. This is a conclusion with
which I do not wish to argue. However, I think that Ackerman's
22

517 U.S. 620, 645-46 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[B]ecause those who

engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in
certain communities, have high disposable income, and, of course, care about
homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, they
possess political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and
statewide.") (internal citations omitted)
23 See Gilreath, supra note 10, at 924 ("In the November 2004 elections,
constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage passed in every state (11
total) in which they appeared on the ballot.").
24 Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. LAW REV. 713, 730-

31(1985).
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discussion of gays as an anonymous and diffuse minority conjures
a more pointed and important equal protection question. It is not
the ability of gays to distance themselves from their "group" that
should essentially trouble us; rather it is the prejudice that drives
the desire of some (if not many) gays to engage in this group exit
that is most troublesome from an equal protection standpoint. The
ability of gays to " 'pass' and hide their sexual orientation when
the going gets too rough. ...while it may have saved a neck from
the noose, is in no way less of a relinquishment of dignity, a loss of
freedom, than otherwise inescapable victimization or brutality.
Elementally, they are the same."25 Of course, not even all blacks
would fit Ackerman's definition of discreteness. American blacks
have (particularly historically) engaged in what is known as
"passing," in which an African- American with particularly
26
Caucasian features passed as white to avoid discrimination.
The Watkins majority noted that, rightly or wrongly,
immutability has become a catchphrase in equal protection
jurisprudence most often associated with the third prong of the
Watkins test. 27 The requirement of immutability is a critical
problem for gays asserting equal protection claims. It also seems,
as I indicated earlier, largely a problem that arises not from a
settled jurisprudence, but from an admittedly long-standing
misconception about equal protection analysis. Still, the ability of
gays to escape group prejudice by pretending to be straight remains
a critical problem for gays asserting equal protection claims.
B. A Word on Choice
As I begin to argue against the centrality of immutability to
suspect class status, I am compelled to note that I find it worse than
benighted that a debate over the immutability of sexual orientation

25 GILREATH, supra note 1, at 129.
26

For a dramatic portrayal of this concept, see generally ALEX

STEVENS, QUEEN: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY

life of Haley's grandmother).
27 See supra text accompanying note 19.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/3
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still rages in our nation.2 8 As one pair of scientific observers has
noted:
Because we are biological beings, all our thoughts, actions, and
emotions must have a biological substrate at some fundamental
level. Thus, we should not ask if sexual orientation is biological.

We should not even ask if it is primarily biological. How could
biological and psychosocial factors be teased apart, and what
units of measurement would allow them to be assessed and
weighed against one another to determine which is more
important? From a scientific perspective, it would be more

productive to ask about the alternative pathways through which
biological and experiential
factors might interact to influence
29
orientation.
sexual

Those who cling to the rhetoric of choice to support their
prejudices need only consult gay people themselves to dispel the
myth that sexual orientation is a chosen "lifestyle." 30 I can do little
better than to quote British poet and novelist Vita Sackville-West
(perhaps best known now as the sometime lover of Virginia
Woolf) who put it most eloquently:
I am qualified to speak with the intimacy a professional scientist
could acquire only after years of study and indirect information,

because I have the object of study always at hand, in my own
heart, and can gauge the exact truthfulness of what my own

28

See, e.g., Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linage Between DNA Markers on the X

Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (1993); Simon
LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034 (1991); J. Michael Bailey & Richard C.
Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 38 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1089 (1991). See generally TIMOTHY F. MURPHY, GAY SCIENCE
(1997).
29 William Byne & Mitchell Lasco, The Origins of Sexual Orientation:Possible
Biological Contributions, in SAME SEX: DEBATING THE ETHICS, SCIENCE, AND
CULTURE OF HOMOSEXUALITY 107 (John Corvino ed., 1997).
30 Moreover, the very work (be it arguably important) of searching for a "cause"
of homosexual sexual orientation reflects the longstanding belief that
homosexuality is a glitch in need of explanation. No one, we might observe, is
searching for the "cause" of heterosexuality.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
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experience tells me. However frank, people would always keep
something back. I can't keep back anything from myself.3 1
Consequently, Sackville-West knew, with certainty, that
she was lesbian (or, at least, bisexual) in the same way she might
have known of any other personal fact about herself: woman,
mother, Briton. Her sexual orientation was as much a part of her
identity as any of those, and she did not need the deliberation of
science to place the fact beyond doubt. Nevertheless, the debate
continues, with people, whether through obtuseness or pathology,
refusing to accept the naturalness of gay sexuality3 2 - with a great
many of those people appointed to the federal bench.
C. Hardwick's Long Shadow: The Cost of Immutability
How exactly did the focus on biological immutability for
sexual orientation arise? It seems to have arisen in a desperate
attempt to litigate around the Supreme Court's opinion in Bowers
v. Hardwick.
Gay rights litigators were at a loss as to a
31 NIGEL NICOLSON, PORTRAIT OF A MARRIAGE

106 (1973).
32 Of course, there is not consensus on the importance or even morality of
biologic/genetic studies for the "cause" of homosexuality among scientists or
gay rights activists themselves. See, e.g., Paul R. Wolpe, 7 NATURE NEUROSCI.
1031, available at http://www.nature.con/neuro/journal/v7/nlO/full/nn1324.html
("Scientific inquiry into sexuality is among the most ethically charged of all
behavioral research.") For a famous criticism linking the search for a "cause" to
the perpetuation of stigma, see Donna Minkowitz, Recurit, recruit, recruit!, THE
ADVOCATE, Dec. 29, 1992, at 17. Minkowitz touched off a firestorm by stating
that she chose to be a lesbian. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
Minkowitz's self-perceived ability to make a choice about her sexuality, might
itself be an inborn feature that she did not choose and has no control over.
Essentially, she is claiming to be bisexual. I am skeptical about how many true
bisexuals there are, but there are doubtless some, and there seem to be more
bisexual women than men. The true bisexual has the ability to be fulfilled
sexually with either gender, an ability that is lacking in the vast majority of
people who perceive themselves to be either "gay" or "straight" by no choice of
their own, and beyond their control. Those terms are simplistic, but the point is,
sexual variations or shades of gray say nothing about whether people choose to
fall here or there on the Kinsey scale of shades of gray. The extent of
polarization of sexual orientation (in any individual or people generally) is a
totally separate issue from the extent of choice involved in sexual orientation.
33 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (finding no "fundamental right
to engage in homosexual sodomy" in refusing to invalidate a state sodomy law).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/3
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conceivable way to protect gays from various forms of
discrimination in employment, housing, and so on, when the
nation's highest court had ruled "the conduct that defines the class
criminal. 34 Hardwick, lower courts reasoned, had foreclosed 35the
possibility of heightened scrutiny for gay discrimination claims.
Hoping to escape the Court's heavy hand, gay advocates
seized on a body of academic literature taking shape in the early
1980s. 36 Most academic treatment centered on the growing belief
that sexual orientation was settled by the time of or shortly after
birth and was prospectively unchangeable. Attorneys and law
professors drew from many of the studies recounted earlier, 37 in
hope of responding to a door opened 38 in the Supreme Court's
decision of Frontiero v. Richardson.39 In Frontiero,the plurality

reasoned that sex discrimination claims deserved heightened
constitutional scrutiny because they involve: "a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination" perpetuated through
"stereotyped distinctions between the sexes"; the "high visibility of
the sex characteristic: exposing women to 'pervasive
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
35 See, e.g., Padula, 822 F.2d at 103 ("We therefore think the courts' reasoning
in Hardwick ... forecloses appellant's efforts to gain suspect class status for
practicing homosexuals. It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare
status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause."); High Tech Gays
v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir.)
("[B]ecause homosexual conduct can ... be criminalized, homosexuals cannot
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class . . "), reh'g denied, 909 F.2d 375
(9th Cir. 1990).
36 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Fact, Norm, and Standard of Review - The Case
34

for Homosexuality, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 575, 583-85 (1985).
37 See supra note 28.
38

This is a supposition endorsed by Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the

Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 503, 507 (1994), and with which I agree.
39 A plurality of the Court concluded that sex-based discrimination warranted
strict scrutiny. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). The concurring justices, however,
refused to mandate this standard. 411 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
The Court resolved the scrutiny issue three years later in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976), in which a majority of the Court compromised and
applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to gender discrimination claims.
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discrimination"' and the fact that "sex, like race and national
origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the
40
birth.
of
accident
But the immutability argument, when introduced by gay
advocates, proved to be friendly fire, precisely because of the
volatile state of the scientific arguments concerning sexual
orientation. 4 1 Generally, the courts have rejected the immutability
claim outright. Even in Romer v. Evans, the moment when gays
arguably began to emerge from Hardwick's shadow, the
immutability argument fell on deaf judicial ears. As testament to
the plaintiffs' counsels' wisdom, or at least their ingenuity, the
immutability argument presented to the Romer court was a
substantially watered down version. The plaintiffs argued that,
though sexual orientation is "highly resistant to change," its
"etiology" is unknown and that "it is not necessary for a trait to be
genetically determined for it to be an involuntary trait that is highly
resistant to change." 42 But underscoring the danger of muddying
the waters with immutability assertions, the court apparently heard,
and certainly addressed, a much more stringent argument. 43 The
court rejected the immutability claim by a reading of precisely
the
44
it.
buttress
to
hoped
plaintiffs'
the
which
same science with

40

Frontiero,411 U.S. at 684-686 (as summarized in Halley, supra note 38, at

507).
41 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, No. 91-1394-05, at 5 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct.
1, 1991)
(granting Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings) (holding that
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class, in part because "[t]he issue of
whether homosexuality constitutes an immutable trait has generated much
dispute in the relevant scientific community."), rev'd on other grounds, 852
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
42 Trial Memorandum on Plaintiffs' Case in Chief at 35 & n. 8, Evans v. Romer,
No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993).
43 "Plaintiffs strongly argue that homosexuality is inborn." Evans v. Romer,
1993 WL 518586, at *11.
44 "The preponderance of credible evidence suggests that there is a biologic or
genetic 'component' of sexual orientation, but even Dr. Hamer, the witness who
testified that he is 99.5% sure there is some genetic influence in forming sexual
orientation, admits that sexual orientation is not completely genetic. The
ultimate decision on 'nature' vs 'nurture' is a decision for another forum, not
this court, and the court makes no determination on this issue." Id.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/3
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Be it true or not, the argument from science has done little
to advance the gay cause in the courts. Nor do I see any indication
that the courts are poised to accept the immutability argument in
the near future. Consequently, gay advocates should cease the
ubiquitous insertion of immutability into judicial claims and find
instead some avenue of attack in common 45with those gays who
reject the biological determination argument.
The concentration on immutability in legal arguments is not
only unwise, it is also unnecessary in a well-framed equal
protection analysis. Despite references to it by the courts,
immutability has never been decisively established by the Supreme
Court as necessary for a sustainable claim under the Equal
47
Protection Clause. 46 The Court so held in Bowen v. Gilliard,
when it decided that relatives are not a suspect class. This lack of
an immutability requirement could hardly be more evident that in

I am not suggesting that gays and their allies should shy away from the
science surrounding homosexuality in other areas.
Proving that sexual
orientation, particularly gay orientation, is not volitional may be the key to
arresting longstanding religious and social prejudices. For a discussion, see
GILREATH, supra note 1, at 121 ("[H]omosexuality as biological goes a long
way toward debunking the 'against nature' and religious arguments upon which
antigay prejudice is founded. If homosexuality is imbedded in natural design,
then it cannot, by definition, be unnatural. Excluding a person on the basis of
biology is out of sync with the New Testament theology of the Christian right.")
46 Indeed, at least two Supreme Court justices have declared that settled equal
45

protection doctrine does not include immutability. In a dissent from a denial of
certiorari, Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote:
[D]iscrimination against homosexuals or bisexuals based solely on
their sexual preference raises significant constitutional questions
under both prongs of our settled equal protection analysis.
First, homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of
this country's population. [Gays] are particularly powerless to
pursue their rights openly in the political arena. [And] homosexuals
have historically been the object of pernicious and sustained
hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination against homosexuals
is 'likely . . . to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than . . .
rationality.'
Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)
(quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982))
47 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987).
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the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Richardson,4 ' holding
49
that aliens constitute a suspect class. Alienage is not immutable.
In order to escape the class, one need only become a naturalized
citizen. Yet the Court held that "[a]liens as a class are a prime
example of a 'discrete and insular minority' . . . for whom such

heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 50 Even if one were
to argue that becoming a citizen is not a simple task and that
alienage is not transitory, one could hardly argue with seriousness
that one can easily change sexual orientations, even if such
orientation is, in fact, mutable. 51 The Watkins court seems to
agree:
Although the causes of homosexuality are not fully understood,
scientific research indicates that we have little control over our
sexual orientation and that, once acquired, our sexual orientation
is largely impervious to change. Scientific proof aside, it seems
appropriate to ask whether heterosexuals feel capable of
changing their sexual orientation. Would heterosexuals living in
a city that passed an ordinance banning those who engaged in or
desired to engage in sex with persons of the opposite sex find it

easy not only to abstain from heterosexual activity but also to
shift52the object of their sexual desires to persons of the same
sex?

403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (striking an Arizona law that forbade welfare
payments to aliens unless they had lived in the country for at least 15 years).
49 State courts, as well, have reached suspect class status for gays without
invoking trait immutability. For example, the Oregon Court of Appeals held
that "immutability - in the sense of inability to alter or change - is not
necessary" because alienage and religious affiliation, which are not immutable,
have been held to be suspect classifications. The court held that the definition of
a suspect class depends upon whether the characteristic assigned relevance has
48

historically been regarded as defining a distinct and recognizable group and
whether that group has been the target of social and political discrimination.
Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 446 (1998).
50 Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
51 For an example of the horrors of treatment in the past, see Anonymous,

Electroshock: "The Agony of the Years After", in JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY
AMERICAN HIsTORY 201 (Meridian Books 1992) (1976).
52 875 F.2d at 726 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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There is additional strong support for the argument that
immutability, by itself, is irrelevant to constitutional inquiry.
There are a number of groups with characteristics that are, so far as
we can know, immutable, whose claims are not afforded
heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes. For example,
neither the traits of intelligence nor physical disability have formed
the basis for suspect class status under the Equal Protection
Clause.53 Instead, it may be "immutability plus" that makes the
difference in certain factual contexts. The Frontieroplurality held
that strict scrutiny was warranted for gender discrimination claims
because gender, in addition to being immutable, "frequently bears
54
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."
Frontiero, then, stands for the premise that "when a characteristic
is both immutable and unrelated to the legitimate purposes
at hand,
55
unfairness."
suggest
may
it
on
based
discrimination
II.
A. If Not Immutability, Then What?
What, if we eschew immutability as a basis for suspect
classification, is the alternative formula for an ethical equal
protection analysis? My concern in this portion of the essay is not
so much with the idea of equal protection as a judicial
phenomenon; rather, my concern is with getting to the purest
conception of equal protection possible. Constitutional law is at

53 See,

e.g., Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686
14 Id. at 686. ("[Slex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth .... [W]hat differentiates sex from
such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with
the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."). But see Halley, supra
note 38, at 508 n. 15 ("There are plenty of careless misreaders of Frontiero who
construe it to state a freestanding immutability factor uninflected by relatedness.
See, e.g., Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
prisoners do not constitute a suspect classification because the status of
incarceration is neither immutable nor an indicator of invidiousness) (citing
Frontiero on immutability without reference to relatedness).").
55Halley, supra note 38, at 508 (emphasis in original).
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bottom an exercise in interpretive theory; 56 consequently, what
follows is my best estimation of a sustainable equal protection
theory.
My thesis is influenced by Michael Perry's 1979 article,
57
Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal.
Perry supposed that equal protection is best understood as guarding
against the punishment of an individual by the use of certain traits
that are irrelevant to an individual's "physical or mental capacity in the form of native talent, acquired skills, temperament or the
like.",58 Race is the paradigm irrelevant trait - what possible effect
could the color of one's skin have on his native abilities? There
obviously is no corollary between race and ability. My problem
with Perry's analysis is that it failed to include sexual orientation
within its wide swath, because Perry believed sexual orientation
not to be an immutable characteristic. Perry fell into the same trap
of exaggerating the importance of the immutability factor
discussed earlier. 59 Nevertheless, his clear view of the ultimate
moral thrust of the equal protection clause is unblemished. As
understood most basically, the equal protection principle is aimed
at ensuring that the irrational and fickle prejudices of a given age
are not institutionalized and compounded by a government
understood to be conceived for all its citizens. Thus, government
may not give its imprimatur to activity that is aimed at
perpetuating the unjust marginalization of a disfavored group by
effectively punishing that group's members on the basis of a trait
that has no relationship to the group members' physical or mental
capacity in the form of native talent, acquired skills, temperament,
56 See generally, Shannon Gilreath, The Technicolor Constitution: Popular

Constitutionalism, Ethical Norms, and Legal Pedagogy, 9 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R.
23 (2003).
57 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023 (1979).
58 Id. at 1066.
59 Perry tells me personally that the "young[er] Michael Perry" who authored the

1979 critique of equal protection at issue here has "died many times." E-mail
from Michael Perry to Shannon Gilreath (Feb. 28, 2005) (on file with author). I
am, as yet, unclear as to Perry's ultimate judgment on the importance of
immutability to suspect classification, but I am more certain, as Perry is my
former teacher and mentor and friend of many years, that his view about the
mutability of the homosexual sexual orientation has changed.
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or the like. This disenfranchisement on the basis of preconceived
irrational prejudice is the particular evil at which equal protection
is aimed.
Perry's explication reveals that equal protection is not
simply about a politically identifiable trait; that is to say, we are
not merely concerned that circles are drawn around people with an
easily discernible trait. The law makes and must be able to make
distinctions based on necessary classifications of citizens. For
example, the law may allow that those born with immutable
handicaps not be hired for jobs when reasonable accommodation
cannot bring their functionality in line with the parameters of the
job requirements. Or consider that universities are allowed to
accept only those who meet stringent academic requirements,
while the ability to meet such requirements arguably turns in part
on immutable genetic factors over which one has no control.
Viewing equal protection as invalidating every conceivable traitbased classification is an unreasonably expansive reading.
Conversely, reading equal protection as invalidating state action
only in the face of an immutable trait is unreasonably cramped.
Rather, equal protection is concerned that members of a group not
be punished for a trait that has no relationship to their intrinsic
worth to society merely because some animosity exists between a
dominant group and the group displaying the trait.
The constitutional principle of equal protection, then,
recognizes the existence of the political evil of class-based political
subjugation and seeks to eliminate (or, at least, to alleviate) its
degrading effects on the subjugated segment of society. This
would seem to be the aspiration of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
These politicians realized that the key to
transforming the racial prejudices of centuries of physical and
moral degradation of blacks was the use of the government to
protect consistently the rights of blacks. 60 A major thrust of the
Equal Protection Clause and the Reconstruction amendments was
righting the historical ills of racism, but they were also intended to
protect members of other unpopular groups - white Republicans in
60

The 1871 enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an example.

§ 1983 is an

enforcement provision, supplying a remedy for violations of the trilogy of postCivil War amendments (U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV), which the
Reconstruction Congress knew were likely to happen in the South.
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the South, for example. To oversimplify equal protection by
transforming it into a concern about "classification" on the basis of
"immutability" is contra contextual. 61 For example, if we were to
extend this "immutability" rationale to its limits, we would have to
conclude that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would
have extended the force of equal protection only to those blacks for
whom race was easily identifiable, but not to those who could
"pass" as white and, thus, effectively transmute races. Rather,
equal protection is ultimately aimed at the type of prejudice and
animus that would drive a light-skinned black person to separate
from home and kin when possible. Those who disapprove of
applying equal protection analysis to laws that do not explicitly
disadvantage blacks on the basis of race and are not specifically
discriminatory ignore the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment is
not written with the specificity of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment, approved by Congress
in June 1866, spoke in more global terms of unabridged equitable
citizenship. 62 It was predicated on an ethical constitutionalism
which drew its power from moral dissent and genuine concern with
"the right to conscience," a central value of American
constitutionalism that allowed the framers of the Reconstruction
amendments to successfully bring content to the constitutional
norm of equality - a content which went appreciably beyond the
63
definition of the equality norm afforded by the courts of the day.
The work of the Reconstruction amendments, centering on equality
and equal protection, constituted a moral restructuring of the
American democratic order based on a respect for universal human
rights. When the Court later dropped its famous Footnote Four in
Carolene Products,64 it signaled that, while it was abandoning its
New Deal fight about property rights, on this fundamental ideal it
could foresee no compromise.
61 For a theory of equal protection in which immutability is central, see

generally,

ALEXANDER

BICKEL,

THE LEAST

DANGEROUS

BRANCH:

THE

SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
62

Even the Slaughter-House Cases concede this. 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) ("The

first section of the fourteenth article, [sic] to which our attention is more
specially invited, opens with a definition of citizenship.").
63 See generally Gilreath, supra note 56.
64See supra note 19.
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But the reader need not rely on my assessment alone; she
may instead turn to a hallowed bit of American jurisprudence for
which we recently celebrated a fiftieth anniversary: Brown v.
Board of Education.65 If race is the paradigm suspect class and
Brown is the paradigm race case, then it is only natural to see what
Brown lends to the discussion of an essentialist equal protection
formula. In fact, it lends much. The Court struck down school
segregation laws, without a single mention of the immutable nature
of race. The Court did this out of recognition that American
racism had for too long enjoyed the life-giving force of
constitutional imprimatur. Blacks were degraded and dismissed as
unfit even to mingle with whites based purely on an irrational
prejudice and fear
of a trait unrelated to the black person's intrinsic
66
ability.
worth or
Thus, as the Court understood it in Brown, race is not a
suspect classification because of the weight of some oppressive
physiological trait from which group members cannot escape.
Historically, race in this country was defined by "one-drop" laws,
holding that individuals sufficiently removed from black ancestors
to be able to "pass" for white were still black by law.67 But some
people black by law who could "pass" as white nevertheless
evaded the defining trait of "blackness" by refusing to self-identify
as black. In such situations, race, at least as a socially constructed
trait, was, indeed, mutable.
Brown made no explanation of race as a genetics issue;
instead, it seemed to be focused on something else that, though
related, is quite different. Brown is cast in terms of state action,
65

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

66

See id. at 494 ("To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications

solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to

be undone .... 'The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of
the negro group."'). Of course, not all critics agree that the Court's guiding
principle was quite so clear. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 31-35 (1959) (decrying the Court's
failure to justify its result in Brown).
67 See, e.g., Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, Comment, "What Are You?": Hapa-Girl
and MultiracialIdentity, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 463, 473-74 (2000) (examining
the development of the "one-drop" rule)
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omission, and complicity in the peTetration and perpetuation of an
irrational class-based social ethos. Race, then, is a suspect class
chiefly because society has assigned meaning, in the form of
irrational prejudice, to a trait displayed by a group that has
historically been the subject of social derision, subjugation, and
marginalization. The fact that one might seek to - or even could evade identification with the trait is irrelevant to Brown's analysis.
Thirteen years later, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court finished what
it had begun in Brown. In Loving, the Court invalidated the states'
remaining antimiscegenation laws prohibiting interracial marriage.
Chief Justice Warren's Loving analysis eschewed any immutable
trait-based approach and, instead, focused on the Virginia law's
irrational classification of blacks and its ultimately illegitimate
purpose (the perpetuation of white supremacy).69
B. TranslatingEqualProtection to Gays
From this perspective, equal protection analysis for gay
people gains plausibility and teeth. One need only read the
concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Bowers v. Hardwick
for evidence of the social ethos that has oppressed gays as longsuffering victims of a discrimination akin to that perpetrated
against blacks. 70 Burger's opinion resonates with echoes of gays
as inter christianionsnon noninandum - not fit to be named or
discussed - invisible unless they seek some measure of equality.
Then they must be put down. The irrational fear and prejudice
against gays has been scaffolded by government action in the form

68 For a similar articulation of the Brown analysis see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 170-174 (1993).
69

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("There is patently no legitimate

overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies
this classification."). For a discussion of equal protection after Loving, see
generally Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword. In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model for Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
70 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring) ("To hold that the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside
millennia of moral teaching.")
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of laws against sodomy, cross-dressing, same-sex marriage, and
gay adoption.
Historically, anti-sodomy statutes were the most effective
mechanism by which governments sought to categorize and
subjugate gays. 71 The laws were driven by a growing social
disapprobation for gays and homosexuality generally. Perhaps this
disfavor grew out of a Millennialist religious revival; whatever the
reason, by the late 1800s, religious groups and "moral societies"
were pressing the law to weigh heavier on gays and lesbians.
Civic groups began to form in order to quell sexual deviance, a job
they believed the law was not doing satisfactorily. For example,
New York City's Comstock Society (the Society for the
Suppression of Vice) was founded in 1872 for just such a purpose.
By the 1890s, the Comstock Society was assisting police in
monitoring "degenerate" behavior in the gay subculture. They
urged officials to use the sodomy law to combat sexual deviants.
Anthony Comstock, from whom the Society took its name, had this
to say:
These inverts are not fit to live with the rest of mankind. They
ought to have branded in their foreheads the word 'Unclean,' and
as the lepers of old, they ought to cry 'Unclean! Unclean!' as
they go about, and instead of the [sodomy] law making twenty
years imprisonment the penalty for their crime, it ought to be
imprisonment for life. 72
Consequently, the legal regime governing homosexuals
changed in menacing ways. Earlier in American history, most
sodomy laws covered only anal sex, and prosecutions were mainly
of opposite-sex offenders.73 But by the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, many states changed their sodomy laws to
71

Much of this historical discussion is taken from my forthcoming book,

GILREATH,

supra note 3, at 13-17.

72 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE

CLOSET

24 (1999).

73 Case law and statutory construction imported from England confined

"sodomy" or "buggery" to anal penetration. But this was prosecutable between
opposite-sex participants, even between husband and wife. See R v.Wiseman,
92 Eng. Rep. 774 (K.B. 1718); R v. Jellyman, 173 Eng. Rep. 637 (1838). See
also R v. Jacobs, 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (1817) (holding that fellatio did not
constitute sodomy).
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make it easier to target gays: either judges expanded the definition
or legislatures simply rewrote their sodomy or "buggery" statutes
to encompass oral sex. 74 In still others, a more indirect approach
was taken; Massachusetts, for instance, made it a crime to be a
"lewd, wanton, or lascivious person." 75 Once sodomy laws
encompassed oral sex, lesbians were vulnerable to the felony
prohibitions of sodomy, a virtual impossibility before, although
lesbians still counted for a mere fraction of the sodomy arrests of
the period.76
Sodomy laws, however, still proved unwieldy. Because
they carried felony penalties, their use was limited by procedural
safeguards like indictment and trial by jury. Aggressive laws
against cross-dressing were implemented to take up the slack.
Gays joined the ranks of Joan of Arc and Elizabeth Cady Stanton
as degenerates for wearing dress not belonging to his or her sex. A
proliferation of "disorderly conduct" laws further added to the
arsenal of gay suppression.
The paranoid McCarthyism of the 1950's asserted that gays
were security risks, easily susceptible to blackmail because of their
subversive lifestyles. This era was the origin of the security risk
argument for the military's gay ban. As is true today, the
government inexplicably discharged openly gay men and women
also, despite the apparent blackmail threat having been removed by
their coming out. J. Edgar Hoover aimed to ferret out "sex
perverts" holding government jobs.
In 1951, Hoover had
identified 406 such "perverts" in government employ. In 1953,
President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10450, formally
dismissing gays from government service.77
Prior to 1900, only four fellatio cases were before the courts as criminalized
sodomy. By 1920, however, 24 states had crafted laws that included fellatio in
the sodomy definition. A further 11 states had their existing statutes judicially
reinterpreted to include fellatio as criminalized activity.
75MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 165, § 28 (1860)
74

76

The first cunnilingus conviction to stand was in a 1917 decision from North

Dakota. State v. Nelson, 36 N.D. 564 (1917) ("We do not desire to discuss the
revolting details of an act such as that complained of. We are satisfied, however,
that it involves an attempt to carnally know with the mouth.")
77 Exec. Order 10,450 § 8(a)(1)(iii), 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953) (mandating
investigation of "immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct" - including
"sexual perversion" - by a government employee) See also Webster v. Doe,
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Newspapers frequently printed the names of alleged
homosexuals apprehended in police raids. Everywhere gays were
subject to victimization and violence by thugs and police alike. In
1955, Harry Hay, founder of the now legendary Mattachine
Society, one of the earliest organizations for the promotion of gay
rights, was called to testify before the House Un-American
Activities Committee. The message conveyed by Hay's summons
was clear: homosexuality was "un-American."
The continuing, corrosive force of irrational prejudice
against gays was sorely evident in the 2004 election, with
constitutional amendments banning gay marriage passing in every
state in which they appeared on the ballot, heedless of principled
arguments by gay citizens for respect for their love lives and
families. 78 The force of homophobia is not found in the
suppression of one right, e.g., sexual privacy or gay marriage, but
rather in the creation and maintenance of a social ethos in which
gay citizens are told they have nothing to offer their country and
that their country has little regard for them. It is a socialization
process that begins at birth and is inculcated even in the
supposedly "neutral" policies of the public education system, in
which discussion of homosexuality is not allowed, while straights
discuss their sexuality so
openly and often that they do not even
79
it.
doing
are
realize they
For illustrative purposes, let us look at what is now one of
the least contentious of gay rights issues - the ban on gays in the
military. 80 Understanding the longtime ban on gays in the military
486 U.S. 592 (1988) (upholding government policy of summary dismissal of
gays).
78 Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah.
79 See Gilreath, supra note 6 ("In many schools, a so-called 'neutral policy'
is
adopted whereby talk of all sexuality is prohibited. But where, I ask, is the
neutrality in a policy that precludes discussion of homosexuality when
heterosexuality is discussed so often and frankly that most heterosexuals do not
even realize they are discussing it?").
80 1 say least controversial because an August 2003 Fox News poll revealed that
sixty-four percent of Americans favored allowing gays to serve openly in the
armed forces (a Gallup Poll of the same year put the number at an even greater
79 percent), a significant increase from the numbers in a similar 2001 poll. It is
also worth noting that the "unbiased" media seems to be signaling different
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and the more recent "don't ask, don't tell" policy requires realizing
that within the military there is a fear of a shifting in the traditional
dominance of machismo, which has heretofore reigned supreme in
the armed forces, as in most of society. The gay man, according to
traditional stereotypes, is puny, weak, and girlish - not fit for
armed service. The straight man, by contrast, is strong and robust,
an engineered warrior. The bigot thrives on difference, real or
perceived, and his hatred is particularly dependent upon it in order
to survive. He is especially pleased when he can point to a long
history of bigotry to validate his continuing position as a bigot.
This was evident in the firestorm created when the United
States Supreme Court forced the gender integration of the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI). 8 Until that time, Virginia did not permit
women to enroll as cadets at VMI. Of course, the usual arguments
about the morality of men and women in close quarters, the morale
of the cadets, and the need to maintain an ordered and disciplined
environment for the all-male population were offered as
justifications for retaining the ban on women.
The Court,
however, decided that the justifications were insufficient to survive
constitutional scrutiny, and that the VMI policy violated equal
protection. A majority of the justices reasoned, quite rightly, that a
longstanding tradition of discriminating against women was in no
way a justification for compounding that unfortunate historical
error by perpetuating it.
Institutionalized bigots, as typified by misogynists at VMI,
are afraid of losing more ground by giving in on the issue of the
integration of openly gay soldiers into the military. In his dissent,
Justice Scalia noted that the Court's decisions "ought to be crafted
so as to reflect those constant and unbroken national traditions that
cultural attitudes here: the Fox News headline chose to focus on the lack of
support for same-sex marriage, rather than the apparent support for lifting the
military ban See Press Release, UCSB Center for the Study of Sexual
Minorities in the Military, New Poll Finds Historic Support For Gays In Military
(Dec.
23,
2003),
available
at
http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressCenter/press-rel-2003_1223.htm.
See
also Dana Blanton, Majority Opposes Same-Sex Marriage (Aug. 26, 2003),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,95753,00.html;
Darren K. Carlson,
Public OK With Gays, Women in Military (Dec. 23, 2003),
http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1 0240.
81 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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embody the people's understanding of ambiguous constitutional
texts. More specifically, . . . 'when a practice not expressly
prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement
of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that
dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper
basis for striking it down."' 82 Extended to its logical limits,
Scalia's argument reads that there is no constitutionally mandated
reason to end a traditional discrimination - unless the Constitution
were to specifically say, "Women must be allowed entrance to any
public educational institution," or "Gays must be allowed to serve
in the nation's armed forces." Of course, the Constitution makes
no such explicit guarantees, and it is important to realize that if
such reasoning predominated, not only would homosexual equality
be impossible, but most of the significant social advances of the
last century, like the advancement of woman's rights or racial
desegregation, would never have come to pass. Scalia's argument
is a variant of the popular argument that because differences have
traditionally been observed - that is, differences in men and
women or gays and straights have traditionally been observed (and
manipulated to leave women and gays powerless) - we should go
right on exaggerating those differences, for no better reason than
simply because it has always been that way. This is exactly the
sort of ingrained trait-based marginalization at which equal
protection is aimed.
Such arguments engender not a legitimate concern for
morality, or security, or morale, or privacy, but rather an irrational
contempt for the homosexual as a person. The example shows
that, viewed through the lens of our essentialist equal protection
principle, the inclusion of gays as a suspect class for equal
protection purposes should turn on the existence of a culture of
degradation and subjugation of gays coupled with the political
legitimization of that social ethos by complicit state action and
validation of prejudice.
C. Equality as ConstitutionalMorality

2

Id. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,

497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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There is much discussion today about the proper place of
religion and religious morality in American politics and law.83 Yet
the Constitution provides for Americans an independent morality
of reason, republican government, and democratic justice. The
Equal Protection Clause was aimed at righting centuries of racial
degradation and subjugation aimed at American blacks. Blacks
were held captive by a morality that made no place for them and
not only defined them by a trait that was part of their physiological
definition, but also redefined - constructed - that trait into
something wholly separate from its essential biology for use as a
tool of subjection. Brown, in turn, was a step toward righting the
immorality of Plessy,84 in which the Court, contrary to obvious
principles of equality, drew circles around American blacks based
on a trait that bore no relationship to their personhood.
I have elsewhere compared the historical status of gays in
this country with the caste-based prejudices against the Indian
pariah.85 Equal Protection forbids the arbitrary isolation of groups
of people into untouchable categories exempt from basic moral
freedoms of self-determination and liberty of conscience that
subject caste members to numerous legal burdens not borne by
citizens outside the caste. 86 For example, in declaring that the
See, e.g.,

F. DRINAN, S.J, CAN GOD AND CAESAR Co-EXIST?
BALANCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM & INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) (particularly
83

ROBERT

Ch. 4 "Religious Freedom in the United States") (discussing the
interrelationship of government and religion in the promotion of morality and
stability); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY

N AMERICAN POLITICS

(1991) (addressing the role of religious
ROBERT AUDI &

morality in the politics of a morally pluralistic society);

NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE

(1997) (presenting

differing viewpoints on the appropriateness of religious morality in politics).
Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) with Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
85 See GILREATH, supra note 3, at 99 ("In the past century, every state
84

made homosexuality a felony or otherwise criminal offense. The gay
person was brutalized, politically marginalized, and shoved into a
pariah caste."); see also id. at 90-91 (comparing the treatment of the
Indian "Untouchables" under the Nehru administration with the
treatment of American gays.)
86 For a similar, but decidedly narrower caste-based equal protection
articulation, see Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MICH. L. REV. 2410
(1994). Sunstein articulates his anticaste principle as follows:
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/3
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Massachusetts state constitution mandated gay marriage, the
Goodridge court noted that same-sex couples were deprived of
many statutory benefits extended to married couples, including:
joint state income tax filing; tenancy by the entirety; extension of
benefit of homestead protection to one's spouse and children;
automatic rights to inherit property of a deceased spouse who
does not leave a will; rights of elective share and of dower;
entitlement to wages owed to a deceased employee; eligibility to
continue certain businesses of a deceased spouse; the right to
share the medical policy of one's spouse; thirty-nine-week
continuation of health coverage for the spouse of a person who is
laid off or dies; preferential options under the state's pension
system; preferential benefits in the state's medical program;

access to veterans' spousal benefits and preferences; financial
protections for spouses of certain state employees killed in
performance of duty; equitable division of marital property on
divorce; temporary and permanent alimony rights; the right to
separation support that does not result in divorce; the right to
bring claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium; funeral
and burial expenses and punitive damages resulting from tort
actions.87

[T]he anticaste principle forbids social and legal practices
from translating highly visible and morally irrelevant

differences into systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a

very good reason for society to do so. On this view, a special
problem of inequality arises when members of a group suffer
from a range of disadvantages because of a group-based
characteristic that is both visible for all to see and irrelevant
from a moral point of view. This form of inequality is likely to
be unusually persistent and to extend into multiple social
spheres, indeed into the interstices of everyday life.
Id. at 2411-12. Sunstein's focus on trait visibility, however, would bring
discrimination against women and blacks into the anticaste purview but would
leave the poor, Jews, and gays outside of the principle. See id. at 2438, 2444.
87 Gilreath, supra note 10, at 923. See also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass. 2005) ("The benefits accessible only by way of
a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death.
The department states that 'hundreds of statutes' are related to marriage and to
marital benefits. With no attempt to be comprehensive, we note.., some of the
statutory benefits conferred by the Legislature on those who enter into civil
marriage ....)
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The placement of gay couples, similarly situated with straight
couples, into a lower legal caste is evident.
In his oft-invoked Plessy dissent, Justice Harlan intoned
that "[t]here is no caste here ....

We boast of the freedom enjoyed

by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to
reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts
the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our
fellow-citizens, our equals before the law." 88 In Plyler v. Doe, the
Court, in striking a law depriving illegal alien children of a public
education, noted that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause was intended
to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based . . .
legislation." 89 Likewise, the Court has noted that the Constitution
does not permit states to "divide citizens into . . . permanent

classes." 90 This interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment seems
consistent with the defense of the amendment proffered during the
Reconstruction debates by Senator Howard, who declared the
amendment's major purpose to "abolish all class legislation . . .
and ...

the injustice of subjecting
one caste of persons to a code
another." 91

not applicable to
Equal Protection is rightly invoked to right historical
wrongs in which a group is held in bondage by a prevailing
cultural morality, imprisoning them in a lesser caste and
conflicting with our constitutional morality of equality for all
people. Constitutional equal protection doctrine, if interpreted and
applied in its essential formula, may be the only real morality
involved in these repressive equations. The morality, be it
religious or otherwise, which has historically belittled gays has
been descriptive, offering only a restatement of societal prejudices:
"Discrimination against gays is justified because gays are
immoral." If the implied morality here is merely a restatement of
social mores of fear and hatred of gays, then the issue is indeed one
of moral import. The problem inheres in the extension of this
88

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559; 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

89 457

U.S. 202, 213 (1982).

90 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982) ("It would permit the states to
divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes. Such a result
would be clearly impermissible.")
91 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
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logic. By this definition of morality, even the Nazis were moral
when they began a campaign to systematically murder Europe's
Jews. 9 2 Surely, Americans should reject the mere regurgitation of
phobias and neuroses as moral authority. In order to draw legal
and political boundaries around groups of citizens, we need a
normative morality - one that is prescriptive and based on reason.
Normative morality is based on fairness and an essential
consistency in the way we apply our moral prescriptions to
members of society. Such is the central thrust of the Equal
Protection Clause: All citizens must be treated equally under the
law - unless there is a justifiable reason, beyond mere collective
prejudice, for imposing legal burdens. Such reason arises only
when the trait which is the subject of the moral judgment is
directly related to the person's physical or mental capacity - in the
form of native talent, acquired skills, temperament, or the like. By
this definition, the fact that many - or even most - people dislike
gays is not reason enough to legally discriminate against them.
Here, we might tweak (or perhaps more fully develop)
Professor Perry's definition of equal protection. We might say that
equal protection is meant to prohibit the marginalization of a
citizen or group of citizens based on a merely descriptive moral
disapproval of a trait, or the display of a trait, immutable or
otherwise. This is the answer to the inevitable but ultimately false
moral conundrums asserting that favorable legal treatment for gays
will lead to leniency regarding rape, incest, bestiality, murder, and
a host of other horribles. Viewed in light of a moral imperative,
the answer is quite simple - there is an independent, normative
basis, beyond the merely descriptive, for condemning these
"choices." These activities are inherently injurious to their objects
or victims, and society's just condemnation
goes well beyond any
93
discomfort.
or
dislike
descriptive
merely
92

For an elaboration of this point, see RICHARD

MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE:

A

STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 31 (1998).
93 Some critics might regard my normative reasoning here as ultimately merely

descriptive and, thus, self-defeating. They might say that my rationale,
exemplified by the differences I perceive between partners in a same-sex
relationship and murderers or rapists, is little more than my preference for a
society in which we do not kill or sexually violate our fellow citizens (in much
the same way that religious fundamentalists prefer only heterosexual families or
missionary sex). But I submit that there is a reasonable, rational difference Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
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An excellent example of this theory at the state level is the
decision of Commonwealth v. Wasson by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in 1993. 94 The Wasson Court concluded that Kentucky's
constitution barred the criminalization of consensual same-sex sex
acts by addressing the commonwealth's contentions thusly:
The issue here is not whether sexual activity traditionally viewed
as immoral can be punished by society, but whether it can be
punished solely on the basis of sexual preference. .

.

. The

question is whether a society that no longer criminalizes
adultery, fornication, or [sodomy] between heterosexuals, has a
rational basis
to single out homosexual acts for different
95
treatment.

The Wasson Court, albeit on state constitutional grounds,
broke with the prevailing trend and declared homosexuals a
"separate and identifiable class" for purposes of equal protection
analysis. 96 The Kentucky court answered the question as follows:
The Commonwealth has tried hard to demonstrate a legitimate
governmental interest justifying a distinction [between
homosexuals and heterosexuals], but has failed. Many of the
claimed justifications are simply outrageous: that "homosexuals
are more promiscuous than heterosexuals ... that homosexuals

enjoy the company of children, and that homosexuals are more
prone to engage in sex acts in public." The only proffered
justification with superficial validity is that "infectious diseases
are more readily transmitted by anal sodomy that by other forms
of sexual copulation." But this statute is not limited to anal
just because there is. The reasoning of my imagined critics is the same kind of
thinking that led Arthur Leff to conclude that "normative [legal] thought
crawled out of the swamp and died in the desert." Arthur Allen Leff,
Commentary, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
VA. L. REv. 451, 454 (1974) Normative thought is more than just nose counting

and loud voices. Like Professor Leff, I am not prepared to give up on normative
thought. I may not be able to articulate it beyond its irritating simplicity, but,
damn it, "napalming babies is bad .... And the 'law' has always known it, that
is the source of its tension and complexity." Id. at 481 (emphasis in original).
14 842 S.W.2d
487.
95
96

Id. at 499-501.
Id. at 501.
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copulation, and this reasoning would apply to male-female anal
intercourse the same as it applies to male-male anal intercourse.
In the final analysis we can attribute no legislative purpose to
this statute except to single out homosexuals for different
treatment for indulging their sexual preference by engaging in
the same activity heterosexuals are now at liberty to perform....
We need not sympathize, agree with, or even understand the
sexual preference of homosexuals in order to recognize
their
97
justice.
criminal
of
bar
the
before
treatment
equal
to
right
Use of the political process to coerce disfavored individuals
into different ways of being - or at least of seeming - would fall

squarely within the Equal Protection Clause and Carolene's
protection. 98 Thus, gay rights advocates would do well to shift the
debate to this sort of question: Is an individual displaying a
particular trait (homosexuality) being coerced into altering the
display of that trait to fit conventional norms or otherwise be
punished? Of course, the question must be cast to demonstrate that
the trait is not conduct alone, but rather conduct as the result of
some deeper (if not strictly immutable) trait. To put it another
way, the debate must focus on the trait - the sexual orientation that produces the behavior. This echoes Judge Rheinhart's
dissenting view in Watkins: sodomy may be an issue of privacy,
but homosexuality is an issue of identity.99 Equal protection, then,
guards against a type of moral slavery that would cause one to alter
one's identity to avoid peril at the whim of the dominate society. 00
Immutability's importance, if it had any, recedes; unless the
identity trait, be it chosen or immutable, relates to the individual's
native physical or mental ability in a way that would allow
normative moral action, it cannot be the basis for different
treatment under the law.
97

Id. at 501.

98 See supra note 19.

99 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1353 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), diff. results reached on reh'g, 875 F.2d 699, 724-28
(9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
'0o David A.J. Richards coined the term "moral slavery" in IDENTITY AND THE
CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006

56 (1999).

JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 9

III. LAWRENCE AND THE FUTURE OF EQUAL PROTECTION FOR
GAYS

This discussion would be far from complete if I were to
stop short of any discussion of Lawrence v. Texas10 1 and of what
that case might mean for equal protection claims brought by gays
and lesbians. Most scholars, including me, anticipating the
decision in Lawrence surmised that the Court would strike the
Texas statute at issue on equal protection grounds.
Few
anticipated the broad strokes with which the Court actually painted
in its explicit overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick and striking all
sodomy laws - even facially neutral laws - because they infringed

the rights of gay people.
In the last paragraph of his dissenting opinion from Bowers
v. Hardwick'0 2 - a dissent which reads like the collective sigh of
America's gay citizens, Justice Blackmun posited that:
It took but three years for the Court to see the error in its analysis
in Minersville School District v. Gobitis [a case requiring salute

to the American flag over religious objection] and to recognize
that the threat to national cohesion posed by a refusal to salute
the flag was vastly outweighed by the threat to those same values
posed by compelling such a salute. I can only hope that here,
too, the Court soon will reconsider its analysis and conclude that
depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how
to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat
to the values most deeply rooted in our 0Nation's
history than
3
tolerance of nonconformity could ever do. 1
It would be seventeen years before Justice Blackmun's
mustered hopefulness became reality and the Court explicitly

'0' 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
102 Id. at 578 ("Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled....

The

petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.")
103 478 U.S. 186, 213-14 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/3
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overruled Hardwick in Lawrence v. Texas. 10 4 Of course, both of
these cases dealt with claims disposed of by a reliance on the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not by any recourse
to equal protection per se. It is embarrassing (or should be) to have
to point out to law students that due process and equal protection
are two separate animals, let alone to point this out to a federal
judge. Yet, in his dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia reasoned that,
after Hardwick, it would be anomalous
to declare gays a suspect
0 5
purposes.1
protection
equal
for
class
The Hardwick Court's analysis turned on the perceived
unimportance of the asserted liberty interest, as the Court cast it the right to engage in homosexual sodomy - to America's "concept
of ordered liberty."' 106 The gravamen of the Hardwick discussion,
then, turned on the nature of the asserted liberty and not on the
invidious intent of the state of Georgia in enacting its sodomy
laws. But if my view of the general thrust of the equal protection
clause as detailed above is accurate - that equal protection is aimed
at forbidding irrational, subjective, prejudicial responses on the
part of the majority toward an identifiable minority - the alleged
triviality of any one asserted liberty interest in the scheme of the
Court's due process jurisprudence should carry little weight. In
my opinion, Romer, while stopping short of announcing a
heightened classification for sexual orientation, was a logical step
in that direction. In Romer, we have the Court recognizing that a
specific law targeting gays is the result of a wider, more pervasive
discrimination. 10 7 This is why Justice Scalia is quick to reprimand
104 539 U.S. at 578 ("The rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful

analysis.... [The dissent], in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers
and should control here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is
not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick
should be and now is overruled.").
105 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S 620, 642 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Bowers
still suffices to establish a rational basis for the provision. If it is rational to
criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special favor and protection
to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the conduct.").
106 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986).
107 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32 ("[Iff a law neither burdens a fundamental right

nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. Amendment 2 fails, indeed
defies, even this conventional inquiry.... [T]he amendment seems inexplicable
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
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10 8
the Court for "mistak[ing] a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite."
Once this pattern of discrimination has been established, it
becomes permissible to ask if all laws targeting gays do not
somehow grow out of this same pervasive prejudice - the key
ingredient to equal protection analysis as I described above.
By this same reasoning, we also see that, although Justice
Scalia's pronouncement of Hardwick's prohibition of suspect or
quasi-suspect class status for gays as a non sequitur was fallacious,
because the two provisions - equal protection and due process are separate and independent jurisprudential mechanisms, there
might, indeed, be some cognizable link between the two. This is
because in analyzing a law under equal protection we look at why
that law exists. We ask whether it is a law animated by some bare
prejudice against gays as a class, as explained above, without some
relevant relation to their abilities or personhood. By looking at
such laws through the lens of Hardwick, we have a pointed dejure
pronouncement that gays are immoral, and that laws that target
them, based on nothing more that the prevailing societal view that
they are immoral and must be controlled as such, is sufficient to
provide a rational basis for discriminatory laws. Thus, Hardwick,
taken to its limits, informs us that, in so far as gays are concerned,
a legal recognition and promotion of this morality cannot
constitute the invidious intent necessary to bring the laws into
equal protection's purview.
Enter Lawrence. The Lawrence decision can, admittedly,
be confusing in terms of equal protection at a first read. In fact,
one might conclude, particularly after reading Justice O'Connor
concurring in the judgment, 10 9 that the Court is specifically
eschewing an equal protection approach. Lawrence explicitly
overrules Hardwick and announces a "protection of liberty under
the Due Process Clause [that] has a substantive dimension of

by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship
to legitimate state interests.") (citations omitted)
108 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
109 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I agree with the
Court that Texas' statute banning same-sex sodomy is unconstitutional. Rather
than relying on the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, as the Court does, I base my conclusion on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.") (citation omitted)
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l0
fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.""
Certainly, its direct relation to Hardwick, along with such
statements, indicates that the Court took action by employing a
substantive due process rationale. Indeed, the Court notes that to
leave intact sodomy laws neutral on their faces (like the law at
issue in Hardwick), as the Court would have done under Scalia's
(and O'Connor's) understanding of equal protection, would have
left the state free ultimately to criminalize the lifestyles of gaysto ultimately brand gays criminals-simply because a law, though
unfairly applied, purported to apply equally to homosexuals and
heterosexuals."
For precisely this reason, Justice O'Connor's rush to a tidy
solution by employing an equal protection analysis was insufficient
for the majority. Justice O'Connor's reasoning relied on a noble
but ultimately misplaced assurance that if sodomy laws applied
equally to the heterosexual majority, who she apparently reasoned
also engage in oral and anal sex, then the majority would not long
tolerate such laws that also put them at risk of criminal sanctions.
But O'Connor apparently forgot the lesson taught to us by
Hardwick. Michael Hardwick was joined in his petition by a
heterosexual couple who claimed that they wanted to engage in
sodomy but were "chilled" from doing so by Georgia's facially
neutral law; however, the Hardwick Court wasted no time in
declaring that these parties lacked standing, since it seemed
unlikely that they would be subject to arrest, let alone
prosecution. 1 2 Justice O'Connor failed to recognize that a law
that demeans a minority by inference from their consensual sexual
relationships, while leaving the majority - although threatened by
the letter of the law - unaffected, provides little in the way of
impetus for the majority to demand the law's demise. One might
also take O'Connor to task for failing in her statement that "so long
as the Equal Protection Clause requires a sodomy law to apply
equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and

110
Id.
at 565 (majority opinion).
11 Id. at 575 ("Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn
differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex
participants.")
112 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2 (1986).
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heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long stand in our
democratic society"'' 1 3 to remember that Hardwick also raised an
equal protection claim for discriminatory enforcement that was
quickly dismissed when the Court completely rewrote the question
with which it was presented.
Despite the shortcomings in her opinion, however,
O'Connor's reasoning does indicate the equal protection problems
inherent in facially neutral statutes that criminalize sodomy. She
argued that even an unenforced sodomy prohibition "brands all
homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for
1 14
homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else."
By subjecting homosexuals to "a lifelong penalty and stigma," this
was a "legislative classification that threatens the creation of an
underclass."' 1 5 In other words, even when not enforced against
heterosexuals, a law that definitely applies to homosexuals,
assuming that they do not remain as life-long celibates, leaves the
state free to discriminate against homosexuals in employment,
parenting, marriage, and so on, simply by charging that the
conduct to which they inevitably subscribe is illegal. Surely, the
law may treat criminals differently. The dissenting justices in
Lawrence underscored this view, missing the majority's point but
making it in the same sweep by claiming that sodomy's
criminalization justified turning gays and lesbians into secondclass citizens.16
O'Connor's point, despite her ultimate skirting of the
problem, that such laws lead to "discrimination both in the public
and the private spheres"''1 7 and the classing of gays as "unequal in
the eyes of the law, ' ' "1 8 is salient. Accordingly, the majority
113 Lawrence, 539

U.S. at 584-85 (O'Connor, J. concurring).

4

Id. at 581.
115 Id. at 585 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J.,
11

concurring)).
116 Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is (as Bowers recognized) entirely
irrelevant whether the laws in our long national tradition criminalizing
homosexual sodomy were 'directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.'
... [T]he only relevant point is that it was criminalized.")
117 Id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 575 (majority opinion))
1l

Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring)

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol9/iss1/3

2006]

OF FRUIT FLIES AND MEN

responded with a rationale that goes further in blending substantive
due process and equal protection analysis, and, I submit, to moving
gays to quasi-suspect or suspect class status, than any precedent of
the Court. Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia thinks that he has
scored the sinking hit when he proclaims that "[n]ot once does [the
majority] describe homosexual sodomy as a 'fundamental right' or
a 'fundamental liberty interest."' 1 19 Of course, he is right. But far
from failing to recognize the significance of the issues presented,
as Scalia would charge, the majority chose to focus on the status of
the relationship targeted by the law because the law at issue in
Lawrence presented questions of a relational nature, i.e., questions
of the human dignity of those in the targeted group and the relation
of that dignity to the majority society, as much as it implicated
spatial questions, i.e., the extent to which certain sex acts are
within the constitutional purview of privacy. 120 Because sodomy is
so completely (and surely Hardwick helped perpetuate this)
associated with gay men, and to a lesser degree lesbians, even if
the Texas law at issue in Lawrence, like the Georgia law at issue in
Hardwick, had been applied equally to gays and straights, or not
applied at all to either group, the law would still have121
been antigay
statement.
cultural
demeaning
inherent
in terms of its
Thus, the Court's decision in Lawrence ripped away any
basis the dissenting justices and their ilk had for turning a history
of prejudicial treatment against American gays into a
119
Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
120

1 would also point out that despite a vigorous dissent in which Scalia declares

that the Court applied an "unheard-of form of rational basis review," id. at 586,
it is far from clear that this is the level of scrutiny the Court is, in fact, applying.
The cases with which the Court began, Griswold, Eisenstadt,etc. are all cases in
which the Court found the liberty interest at stake to be of a fundamental nature.
These cases culminate in perhaps the most contested fundamental right in our
Nation's history - certainly since Brown struck "separate but equal" - the right
of a woman to secure an abortion in her first trimester as enunciated in Roe v.
Wade. The majority ends its opinion by asserting that the state provides no
"legitimate" interest for its sodomy law, but this could easily, in the context of
the rest of the opinion's focus on the fundamental dimensions and pedigree of
the right to sexual privacy in question, be read as "has not even" produced a
legitimate basis, let alone one that would survive the heightened level of
scrutiny I believe the majority applied.
1 As Justice Kennedy put it, such a law "demean[s gay] existence
[and]
control[s] their destiny." Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
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constitutionally sanctioned activity merely by invoking sodomy's
criminalization. To achieve this, the majority realized, invalidating
only facially discriminatory sodomy laws would not suffice. Thus,
the majority's decision, grounded as it is in substantive due
process, has significance of a far greater reach in terms of equal
worth and human dignity when viewed through the lens of equal
protection. The majority recognized this when Justice Kennedy
wrote, "[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter
point advances both interests."'1 22 Accordingly, the Court's
decision, focusing as it does on equal respect and dignity for gay
people, extends equal protection of the laws to gays without
express focus on any "immutability" factor, and provides a future
basis for equality advocates to argue for quasi-suspect
or suspect
1 23
Americans.
lesbian
and
class status for gay
22

1

Id. at 575.

123 Even

if my theory of the scrutiny applied in Lawrence is error, one can easily

conclude, as Justice Scalia seems to, that the Court has applied some heightened
rational basis standard - what some constitutional scholars call rational basis
"with bite." Even if this is the case, my theory that Lawrence has, or should by
judicial integrity extended to its natural limits, put gays on the path to quasisuspect or suspect status is not deflated. An inching toward heightened scrutiny
has been the modus operandi of the Court before. For example, the Court
purported to apply a minimal level of review to invalidate a law preferring men
over women to be estate administrators in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)
("The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to
a state objective that is sought to be advanced. . . ."). Under traditional rational
basis review, a justification of preferring the sex generally possessing the greater
business experience should have proved sufficient to sustain the law. Five years
later, the Court abandoned any pretense of rational basis and declared gender
discrimination subject to intermediate scrutiny. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976) ("To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."). The same arc
is seen in the illegitimacy cases. After it invalidated laws discriminating against
illegitimate children or their parents under a purported minimum scrutiny, the
Court determined that laws based on illegitimacy should be subjected to
intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968)
(law invalidated under minimal scrutiny); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536
n.6 (1971) (law upheld under minimal scrutiny); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
461 (1988) (intermediate scrutiny applied).
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CONCLUSION

I have no crystal ball that allows me to forecast the changes
George W. Bush's Supreme Court appointments will bring to equal
protection jurisprudence. I am certainly not na've enough to
believe that a moral theory of equal protection of the kind I argue
here will soon find general application. For this reason, critics
might brand it of limited practicality. Yet I believe that it is more
workable than the immutability-based theory with which courts are
currently asked to grapple - generally to no avail. Given the
central place of equality in our understanding of democratic
liberty, it is an honest base from which to view the gay rights
struggle - certainly more so than a reduction of equality to a
reliance on immutability or cause of sexual orientation.
Discrimination against gays is sufficiently akin - in a morally
substantial way - to discrimination based on race and gender. The
remedies available to these groups ought to be available to those
denigrated because of sexual orientation. Both the Romer and
Lawrence Courts lend support to this position in their articulation
of the fundamental importance of the liberty at stake in those cases.
Far from being result-oriented anomalies, Romer and especially
Lawrence, like Brown, are, in my view, a resettling of equal
protection on its essentially moral foundations - an effort for
which the Court deserves praise.
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